You said in your recent public speech in Castellon that we’re now living in the age of mega-projects. What exactly did you mean by this?
In
Europe as elsewhere, we’ve entered times marked
by big-footprint projects, organised efforts to do things never before
attempted, adventures of power that touch and transform the lives of millions
of people and their bio-habitats, in unprecedented ways. These ‘megaprojects’ include under-sea tunnels, mining operations, inter-city
high-speed railway networks, new airports and airport extensions. They comprise
entertainment complexes, nuclear power stations, banking and credit sector
experiments and new communications and weapons systems. Megaprojects are
distinguished by their astronomical design and construction costs (their price
tag is often well in excess of a billion euros). Their complexity, scale and
deep impact upon communities of people and their environment are also striking.
What have been the consequences
of mega-projects in the region of Valencia?
My impressions are
naturally those of an outsider, but the impact of projects such as the lavish opera
house Valencia and the white elephant Castellon airport, is plain to see, and
typical of what happens in the age of mega-projects. Megaprojects create jobs and measurable wealth,
scientific-technical know-how and improved services. Many make our lives
easier; the invention of the Internet by ARPA is proof positive of that. Often
a source of local and national pride, they can generate large profits, but even
when no golden harvest results they add hugely to the private fortunes of their
designers, owners, managers and shareholders. As Senor Calatrava knows, megaprojects
make some people mega-rich. But mega-projects also go wrong.
What are the symptoms of failure?
Unless they are
subject to strict public controls, mega-projects often have damaging effects.
During their design and execution phases, they suffer construction problems,
budget blow-outs and delayed completion schedules. London’s Olympic Games is a case in point:
its bid was originally costed at £2.37 billion; the probable final cost will be
around £24 billion. Spain’s
love affair with mega-projects, notably in the field of construction, saddled
the country with an estimated 100 billion euros of toxic debt. It’s probably
much more than that. When up and running, mega-projects are plagued by chronic
operation problems and ‘normal accidents’. Sometimes the mishaps do irreparable
damage. Hence the household names: the Bhopal gas and chemical leak, nuclear
meltdown at Chernobyl and Fukushima, gigantic oil spills courtesy of the Exxon
Valdez and Deepwater Horizon, the collapse of Lehman Brothers and Bankia.
Such disasters are
growing in number and frequency. I’m afraid that unless things change we’re
heading into a grim future, one in which risky power experiments have catastrophic
effects on the lives of millions of people and their habitats.
Do you see signs of the failure of mega-projects in Valencia, and Spain more generally?
The
behind-the-scenes, poorly-regulated patron-client links forged between the
Spanish cajas, the construction
industry and big-budget regional governments have had heart-breaking effects. Their
wild love affair ended in misery. The regional government of Valencia, proportionately the most indebted in
the whole of Spain,
is broke. Its debt is an estimated 25 billion euros. The region is littered
with ghost towns, unfinished construction projects and an airport with no
planes or passengers. Throughout the country, there is understandably great
disaffection among many citizens. Half of under 25s are out of work. An
estimated one and a half million people have to decide each day between eating
or paying their bills. Perhaps 300,000 young graduates have left Spain since the
onset of the crisis. All this is very bad for the spirit and substance of democracy.
Why are they bad for democracy?
It’s not just that the near-collapse of your banking system and the
current politics of enforced austerity are damaging the daily lives of many
millions of citizens. There’s something else just as sinister: megaprojects resemble sizeable tumours of
arbitrary power within the body politic of democracy. They usually defy the
familiar rhythm of elections. Details of their design, financing, construction
and operation are typically decided from above. Especially when it comes to
military and commercial megaprojects, things are decided in strictest secrecy,
with virtually no monitoring by parliaments, outside watchdog groups or voting
citizens. Unless they’re subject to
strict and independent public monitoring, mega-projects do away with democratic
procedures. They resemble forms of emergency rule in the heartlands of
democracy.
Cases of corruption are common in Valencia. Does
the absence of monitoring promote it?
Yes. Corruption
went viral. It’s true that megaprojects often fail to measure up to the lavish
claims made in their defence because of a variety of factors and forces. Simple
human miscalculation; the blind arrogance and groupthink of those in charge;
inadequate ‘hedging’ for surprise events; bad decisions caused by poor
co-ordination and diffused responsibility chains; systematic lying (what policy
analysts call ‘strategic misinformation’); and unintended chain reactions all
play their part in ensuring that when things go wrong, they really go wrong.
The gargantuan
size and hyper-complexity of mega-projects make matters worse. But substantial
evidence is mounting (the Danish sociologist Bent Flyvbjerg has done the
ground-breaking research) that the root cause of mega-project corruption, the key
source of their failure, is their refusal of robust internal and external
public scrutiny. Not all disasters are human and megaprojects don’t always
fail, it’s true. Yet when they do fail, in 90% of cases, the main cause is the
privatisation of power. Those in charge of operations suppose, mistakenly, that
their mega-organisations can be governed in silence – silence within and
outside the organisation.
There’s something
really paradoxical about this silence. It’s produced,
usually through intensive public relations campaigns which have the effect of
cocooning the mega-project from rigorous public scrutiny. Lots of positive things
are said publicly about the project, despite the fact that they’re often untrue.
In all this, journalists often play along. A rich diet of promises of access,
sinecures and over-dependence on official handouts renders them obedient. They
become ‘plane spotters’, captive cheerleaders of mega-projects, silent cogs in their
machinery of compliance.
There’s a
developing crisis of parliamentary democracy in Spain, so it’s the duty of citizens
to become wiser and more determined, to pay attention to matters of folly, corruption
and injustice, to speak out whenever and wherever necessary. Ancient Greek
democrats cherished parrhesia: bold,
frank, courageous speaking out publicly in defence of the common good. Every
actually existing democracy now needs a good dose of parrhesia. Spain
is no exception.
How would you describe the state of democracy in Valencia and Spain?
Twice during the
past century, Spain
stood at a political crossroad. The present situation clearly differs from the
collapse of the republic during the 1930s, or the moment during the late 1970s
when fascist dictatorship crumbled. Spain is at a new crossroads. Its
citizens and representatives face a fundamental choice. They can continue down
the road that leads nowhere, towards a bad-tempered, highly unequal phantom
democracy whose key political institutions are distrusted and many citizens
feel disaffected. Or Spain
can embrace a fairer and more just society protected by a vigorous form of monitory
democracy (democracia monitorizada).
In other words, a new type of democracy in which there are not just free and
fair elections, but where citizens and their representatives also practise the
art of publicly exposing and humbling arbitrary power (poder abitrario), wherever it exists. For this to happen, much will
have to change. Spanish electoral laws, which produce unfair outcomes, will
need serious revision. New political parties led by honest representatives will
be needed; the present two-party duopoly is choking Spain. A new compromise about the
past, a fresh regional settlement and a greener and more equitable politics of
inter-generational justice are priorities. And public silences will have to be
broken. The basic political mistake of the past several decades mustn’t be
repeated. Hereon, businesses, banks and governing institutions at all levels
must be kept humble, trusted and respected only because their power is subject
to permanent public scrutiny and, ultimately, to the active consent of all citizens.
El Foro Social del Rototom es todo un
acontecimiento ¾casi podría afirmarse que es, sí, un
evento o Ereignis en el sentido de
Heidegger. Mediterráneo en el que caben todo tipo de Odiseas, el Foro Social es
para la provincia de Castellón el elemento dinamizador de una cultura que, menospreciada
genéticamente por el poder político, acerca a nuestras tierras a los pensadores
más radicales del momento: mujeres y hombres que desde la honestidad y la
reflexión se enfrentan a los múltiples problemas de nuestro tiempo con coraje,
proponiendo nuevas vías para la acción humana, desbrozando sendas que todavía
están por transitar. En este contexto hay que ubicar el pensamiento de
Christian Felber, uno de los impulsores de la Gemeinwohl-Ökonomie o economía del bien común. Ayer pudimos charlar
con él después de la rueda de prensa que ofreció a mediodía.
